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INTRODUCTION
JULIUS STONE*

Addressing myself to some of the aspirations in this Symposium
for a lawyer-centered jurisprudence gave me an uneasy sense not
indeed of autrefois vu, nor indeed of autrefois pensi, but at least of
autrefois rdvd. "Jurisprudence" (including the name of it) has always been a mystery, shimmering or murky according to standpoint,
both to the professional neophyte and to the layman. And for the
layman, of course, this mystery is piled on top of the preexisting mystery of law itself.
One of the present writer's activities of the last twenty-five years
has been that of a week by week radio commentator on international
relations. I remember becoming rather gratified from time to time
with the listener response as manifest in public debate and private
"fan mail." I also became rather wearied, before many years at all,
by one kind of question which kept recurring in the fan mail. Letters usually began something like this: "Dear Professor: My husband
and I agreed (or disagreed) absolutely with your talk on the radio
last night." They usually ended something like this: "At any rate,
we are glad to say that we understood everything except the way you
were introduced. The announcer said you were a 'Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence.' We've got an idea what International Law is. But What, Oh What, is Jurisprudence?"
So when, after a while, I got utterly weary with giving miniature
private lectures in letters of reply to individual listeners on what
"Jurisprudence" might be, I finally gave notice that at my next regular
broadcast I would devote two and a half minutes to answering thi
question once and for all. And what I said in that next broadcast
was rather like this:
If you see someone who is doing things to law or writing
or saying things which operate on the rules or apparatus of
the law, you're looking at a lawyerl If you see someone who is
writing or saying things about the things that lawyers are
doing or writing or saying to operate on the rules or apparatus
of the law, you're looking at a juristl But when you finally
(if more rarely) see someone who is also saying or writing
*Challis Professor of Jurisprudence
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things about what jurists are writing or saying about what
lawyers are doing or writing or saying to operate on the rules
or apparatus of the law, then, lo! and behold! you're looking
at a jurisprudent!
Of course, the appropriation of such names is a matter of customary usage at a particular time and place, and such distinctions
have no prescriptive force to bind any particular speaker. In particular, both this intermediate position of "the jurist" and his relation
to "the lawyer" and "the jurisprudent," are debatable. There are
certainly other American usages (fostered by others as well as journalists) whereby "a jurist" means a lawyer who attends a public dinner
(or other public occasion), or a lawyer to whose opinion you want
to give credence, or a lawyer who knows his business, or a lawyer
who has a modicum of ability, or simply a lawyer seen through careless or mystified layman's eyes.
When we have discounted such euphemisms, and allowed for the
debate as to what role is left for the "jurist" today as a separate
type, one thing at any rate is clear. This is that lawyers' activities
have already for a long time been a main (if not the main) focus
of concern of jurisprudence, though at the one or two more or less
rarefying removes of which my radio miniature spoke. No one familiar with the range of jurisprudential literature of the present century will doubt, for example, that the activities of certain lawyers,
especially of the judges, have long been a main concern of jurisprudence, at each of the levels mentioned. We need only to think, in
this regard, of the work of Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, Llewellyn, Jerome Frank and scores of others in the United States; of Kantorowicz,
Heck and the other Interessenjurisprudentenof Germany, or of Francois Gdny, Duguit and others in France; or any of almost all significant
present writings on the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Our Editors, in announcing the subject of this Symposium, and
our contributors in what it has conveyed to them, have certainly entertained no narrowing focus. We may understand its central question
as concerned with the possibility or potentiality of a "lawyer-oriented"
jurisprudence, and interpret this as arising from a view of "lawyers,"
as either the object of jurisprudentialstudy or the group whose concerns set its directions. It would then indicate an orientation of this
Symposium as wide as the legal order and all the values this should
subserve. If we see this question as arising from a view of the lawyer
(in our Editors' words) as "an emerging force in modern jurisprudence," then the field of force actually or potentially polarised around
him is no less wide, though not necessarily congruent. And, on which-
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ever formulation, it is clear that, for all the contributors, orientation
to the lawyer (and to the world into which he must emerge) would
be an orientation not to an autonomous world of law, with its technical precepts and institutions, but rather to the wide-open world of
the social order and the pertinent knowledge of it with all the
achievements, shortcomings, potentialities, and limits which affect
this. The orientation of the lawyer's "emergence," all the contributors
seem variously to be saying, must be an emergence outward, an extraversion from his present concerns.
Nor is any of this really surprising. Those who planned and made
this Symposium (for which the present writer can claim no credit),
and those who now read it, must obviously be aware that "lawyers"
cannot, without gross mutiliation of what remains, be abstracted from
"law." Historically, indeed, amid all the indecisive debates of the
historical jurists and the anthropologists, the best mark for identifying
"law" as a differentiated social control, separately from religious belief, mores and the like, is the appearance of specialised law interpreters and appliers. And these have in turn to be identified by their
use of certain techniques of arguing and of differentiating between
and extending cases, which have been associated with "lawyers."
What is thus true historically may, indeed, also largely still be true
analytically. Hermann Kantorowicz, one of the great pioneers of continental sociological jurisprudence, still had to fix, in his ultima
verba, on such a professional class of interpreters as the decisive mark
in his "Definition of Law." H. L. A. Hart's "rules of recognition,"
basic to his concept of law, have at their operational center the class
of lawsayers, the authenticity of whose lawsaying must (within the
given legal order) be taken as datum. And this is no less central a
position of Karl Llewellyn's final and magnum opus, The Common
Law Tradition.
It may be objected to all this that the central role of lawyers in
both traditional and modern thinking about law is really not pertinent
to the subject of the present Symposium, since the stress of this is not
on lawyers as opposed to farmers, or to entertainers and the rest. This
stress (objectors may say) is on practising attorneys as opposed to
judges, law teachers, administrators, public servants (whatever "legal"
background or duties these others may have), as well as to farmers,
entertainers and the rest. If we can make this distinction at the
present time (as we no doubt can), we would still be faced with
the fact that jurisprudential concern with this group, whether as a
direct object of study or as a class whose concerns and operations are
the object of study, is of long standing. The Roman jurisconsults
were neither judges nor judicial administrators, nor salaried public
servants, nor university teachers, and the counseling of clients was
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for them as much as for the veriest modern office lawyer, a day-to-day
task. With varying direction and depth as the centuries went by, the
relation of the roles, skills, tasks, outlooks, achievements and failures
of the jurisconsults to the vicissitudes of the Roman law has been
a millenial concern of jurisprudence.
Are we to say that the Roman jurisconsults were not practising
lawyers merely because (as is true) they were men of wide outlook
and high vision, as well as technical skills? To do so would be to
characterise our contemporary lawyers not by what they do but by
their shortcomings in the doing of it. Are we to say that the Roman
jurisconsults were not lawyers, because there were not enough of
them, certainly nothing like the hundreds of thousands who somehow
sustain themselves in the United States? To do so would be to recognize "lawyers" only by the spawning of them. Certainly we should
hesitate to say that the Roman jurisconsults cannot be regarded as
lawyers merely because they enjoyed too high a community respect
and esteem for the service which they rendered. For, however stoically
we admit the contemporary lawyer's unfavorable public image, it
would be outrageous to say that this is the lawyer's final and decisive
attribute. Nor is it easy to accept the view that the Roman jurisconsults cannot be regarded as lawyers, just because no monetary fees
were paid for their services. Fee-consciousness is, no doubt, a prominent component in the contemporary lawyer's public image, and perhaps even in this lawyer's image of other lawyers. Yet it would still
be unjust and even extraordinary to take this as a basis for saying
that the Roman jurisconsults are not to be regarded as lawyers in
the contemporary sense. Certainly it would be very startling to think
that our Editors and contributors consider the present venture (which
some of them at least regard as breaking new ground) to be focused
on the lawyer as a fee-receiving rather than a service-giving actor.
The good reader, therefore, should approach this collection on
guard against suggestions from any quarter that its concern with
lawyers' roles and lawyers' preoccupations is breaking wholly new
jurisprudential ground. Such a suggestion (if made) would either be
simply untrue; or the meaning of the term "jurisprudence" in it
would have been arbitrarily restricted; or the term "lawyers" would
have been arbitrarily given a restricted meaning; or more than one
of these. I suspect that it may be rewarding for the reader to proceed
on the hypothesis that any of these liberties may occasionally be
found in one or another of these contributions.
The subject of this Symposium, whatever it precisely be, has a
built-in tendency to dramatisation. A cynic, for example, might regard
the very notion of somehow wedding the concerns of "jurisprudence"
with those of the "lawyer" as filled with something of the entertainment
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value of suddenly mating an anchorite with a woman of easy virtue.
Such a cynic's implicit vision of "jurisprudence" is likely to be as of
a web of thought fine-spun by impractical theorists in innocence of
the world and its realities, and in especial ignorance of human passion, avarice, corruption and inertia and the mundane and sordid
human environment. The cynic's implicit vision of the "lawyer" is
likely to contain admixtures of the ambulance-chaser, the exploiter
ii la Bleak House of estates and litigants, the "fixer" of tickets, the
lackey of the corporate giant and the hoodwinker of juries. Some of
the dramatic import of enterprises like the present may also spring
from tie mere idea that, without them, "jurisprudence" and "lawyers" would (like anchorites and women of easy virtue) not get
together. For even when cynicism is absent, this pulling together of
"jurisprudence" and "lawyers" holds promise as a spectacle for many
who persist in seeing "theory" and "practice" of law as mutually
insulated spheres. For them "jurisprudence" is concerned only with
theory, and is ignorant and disdainful of practice; and "lawyers" are
concerned only with practice and ignorant and scornful of theory.
And even those who do not indulge such naivetds in general may still
be very interested in efforts to reestablish contacts between jurisprudential exponents of theory and the legal practitioners, for they are
well aware of many points where uneven and uncoordinated movements in each threaten or destroy communication between these
spheres.
It is on some such basis as this last that Thomas Cowan offers
his model of inquiry by a kind of dialogue or pas de deux between
practitioners and jurisprudents. This might serve simultaneously
(he thinks) to ascertain the assumptions and beliefs of today's practitioners concerning the law and their actual tasks and aspirations
within it. It would sensitize them to the potentials of tasks and
aspirations for developing and transforming the legal order and the
lawyer's role in it. Not the least value of what he has to say is to
point out that knowledge of this side of practitioners' outlooks is so
limited that we may not even know with what questions a real
dialogue could begin. So that an inquirer should be ready and even
eager to find that practitioners, who are supposed to be the object
of the inquiry, may turn out to be the de facto guides and directors
of it. Thomas Cowan thinks it possible that the practitioner may
himself be modified by his own attempts to understand and articulate
the questions that need asking. So that if we think of this Symposium
(as he obviously does) as geared to the issue whether the lawyer is
"an emerging force in jurisprudence," Cowan would think it not
beyond possibility that any practitioners involved may, before the
inquiry is over, become more of an "emerging force" than they were
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before it began. Such "clinical" investigation, in short, may leave
both the inquirers and the objects of their inquiry different from
what they were before. And part of the answer about the "emergence"
of lawyers as a "jurisprudential force" may have to be sought in the
degree and direction of such movements.
For Iredell Jenkins, on the other hand, the target-lawyers of the
inquiry are not just those of our own times, but all the generations
of lawyers. For him the question whether lawyers are an "emergent
force in jurisprudence" turns in our own times into a challenge to transform the actual situation of today's lawyers. In previous centuries
of common law growth (he thinks) the intellectual, social and moral
traditions which moulded and supported the structure of the law,
and therefore the roles which minister to law, were (as it were) given.
Law "operated within an intellectual, moral, and social order that
was antecedent to and independent of it and that controlled its operations." It did not have to determine what values it should promote,
for it inherited the substance of all this from the established order,
the accepted moral code, the church, the vested interests and customs. Its initiative in defining or changing the patterns of society
was thus very limited. So that generally, Professor Jenkins thinks,
the lawyer of the past reflected the living law, while the theoretician
expounded the natural law; and between them they embodied the
positive law.
All this illustrated, Professor Jenkins believes, the truth that practice and theory, when these are doing their jobs well, are coordinate
and inextricable moments in a unitary process, in which each fills
in the lacunae left by the other. And the basic, (and, he insists), the
literally mortal disease affecting the ability of today's legal profession
to continue to fill its pristine role is the wild and uncontrolled (and
therefore "cancerous") growth of legal doctrine, which is a joy to law
publishers, but to no one else. The resulting threat to the health
of the law is threefold-the growth goes on independently both of its
source in actual life and its goal of a better life. It becomes inert.
And it distorts and even blocks the mutual access between theory and
practice. Iredell Jenkins' earnest consequential analysis and proposals
are directed towards a series of adjustments in the realm of study of
values ("the ideal"), of the actual social interests and forces at work,
and the restructuring of the law itself. All this has radical implications for legal education, and not least for the case method of teaching; and the reader will no doubt tend to assess, by his reaction to
these proposals, the value of the analysis which precedes them.
The contrast of theories and practice in the legal profession is
also central to understanding of the problems raised by Walter
Probert and Louis M. Brown. Judges and practising attorneys (they
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suggest) talk and possibly mean alike; and professors and law students talk alike. Law students as potential attorneys of course tend
to blur this line of division; professors in jurisprudential and other
"cultural" law subjects also blur the line at still other points. But
basically (from this standpoint) the importance of judges and practising attorneys to jurisprudence is that it is only from their postures,
and their "lawyering" activities, that the law can be perceived in the
dynamic cultural realities of its operation and movements.- Even the
American realists (these authors think) failed to grasp this point.
"Rules tended to disappear as they watched, yet inside the process
they [rules] are still clearly visible." So too, the area of relations
which academic lawyers are now categorizing in connection with
lawyer-counseling as "non-official-lawmaking" are not viewed by the
lawyers who act primarily from this aspect. It is an important jurisprudential question, these writers insist, to understand the approach
of the law-actors themselves to conflicts which lawyer activity succeeds somehow in resolving, even when from academic lawyers' points
of view the conflicts are simply irreconcilable. For knowledge of the
ways of lawyers, quite apart from its use in inducting law students
into practice, may often provide a new general perspective on the
social problems faced and handled by lawyers. Not the least important
parts of this new perspective would present the lawyer's role as part
of the interplay of official decisions and private activities; and it
might also make jurisprudence into better sense to those who actually
work with the stuff of the law.
Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal have succinctly restated,
for the purposes of the present Symposium, the blueprint for a contextual and policy-oriented jurisprudence inspired by the values
clustered around "human dignity," elaborated and refined by them
since their seminal statement on legal education a generation ago.
Rather differently from most other contributors, they are concerned
to display the jurisprudential wares already (as it were) available on
the market for illuminating "the daily lives of judges, advocates,
administrators and legislators," rather than to press for jurisprudential
concern to interpret more deeply the actual postures and activities
of lawyers. This is confident therapeutic perspective, in which the
jurisprudence offered is a body of knowledge about law already designed and in being to remedy the shortcomings, inadequacies and
confusions of all who are concerned with law. Most actors on the
legal scene, from law professors and law students, through administrators, draftsmen, judges, and legislators, not to speak of international lawyers, have had this healing message beamed towards them.
And the beam as here relayed is indeed stated broadly enough to
catch them all. But the point is also here clearly implied that the
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legal profession, if it is to become a force for human progress in the
contemporary world, must recognize and take its place in the "public
order of human dignity" within which the lawyer operates.
"What lawyers must do to be saved!," is even more overtly the
message of Arthur S. Miller's provocatively titled "Public Law and
the Obsolescence of the Lawyer." In an age when public law is allpervasive, he thinks, lawyers still are private-law-oriented; in the era
of the "administrative state" they still think that courts are central;
and after Freud they still cling to the ideas of the Age of Enlightenment. These and other deficiencies of lawyers have been made manifest, the author thinks, by their failure to meet the challenge of such
developments as the vast growth of public law, the merger of law
into the political process, and the growth of more rational management techniques in decision-making in "the administrative state."
So that if the Lasswell-McDougal essay might have been subtitled,
"The Lawyers' Road to a Public Order Based on Human Dignity!,"
Professor Miller's and Professor Jenkins' articles might be entitled,
or subentitled, "Why This Lawyers' Road is Closed!"
If we were to dub Lee Loevinger's article in similar mood, we
might perhaps give it the subtitle "What Can Lawyer-Orientation Do
To Save Jurisprudence?" His answer is emphatic. In his view only
an updating of law and jurisprudence from the age of dialectics to
the age of empirics can save jurisprudence. Both dialectic method
in law and empiric method in science are merely, of course, means
of gathering and organizing data. The resistance of lawyers to the
extension of empirical methods (for instance to those of jurimetrics,
of which the author is so devoted and distinguished a leader) is a
clue (he thinks) to their centrally pathological fear. And he believes
that this fear is itself of the stuff of fantasy, born as much out of
ignorance of science as it is out of concern for the law. In the result
Loevinger sees a great hiatus in law, the lack of an institutional means
of conducting empiric research and of collecting, reporting and collating the results for consideration by decision-makers. On this assessment of the plight of both law and jurisprudence, "the addition
of a 'lawyer-oriented' label to the ruminative rationalizations of jurisprudence is not going to do any more to make it productive than
any of the old labels such as 'historical,' 'natural law,' 'analytical,'
'sociological' or 'realistic.'" What law needs, he thinks, is not a
"lawyer-oriented jurisprudence" but a "socially oriented jurimetrics."
Both of the two great systems of gathering data, the empiric as well
as the dialectic, must contribute to the solution of its complex and
proliferating problems.
Of the rich cluster of questions to which the Editors' intentions
gave rise in the minds of the various contributors, Charles D. Kelso
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addressed himself to two main ones. What can study of the behaviour
and needs of practising lawyers contribute to knowledge about law that is, to "jurisprudence"? Are not the problems which practising
lawyers consider to be important worthy of jurisprudential study?
His answer, stated as almost self-evident, is that since lawyers create
and administer the legal system, and advise with respect to it, they
and their activity should certainly not remain the most neglected
study of jurisprudence. Lawyers' functions and the levels of performance of them, the need for new kinds of lawyers (for instance capable of working in harness with non-lawyer specialists), for new
kinds of service institutions (for instance for fact-gathering), or for
para-legal personnel (like the "technicians" of the medical or dental
practitioner) all need to be assessed. Such assessments may be vital
to guide future action in the legislative, administrative, and legal
educational spheres. More knowledge on all these matters could
bring new insights to law teachers as to the relation of theory to
practice, and to law students as to why "'theory" is "practical." The
very search for such knowledge might have drastic effects on the directions of concern of law schools, and their forms of organization. Yet,
of course, these tasks of leavening the study of law with knowledge
about lawyers, will not be well performed by taking short cuts, such
as merely handing over teaching to practitioner-teachers, or merely
reshuffling existing teaching and research personnel and resources, or
by any wholesale flight from specialisms, or by the downgrading of
values pursued in the law to the level of the client-hungry lawyer,
rather than of justice-hungry servants and subjects of an ongoing
legal order.
There are, no doubt, other notable themes which will emerge for
the avid reader from the earnest self-searchings of the contributors
to this issue. But those which come nearest to mutual coherence
would probably have to be stated in a doubly pointed question,
adapted from St. Paul to the contemporary plight of the lawyers.
"When the trumpet faltereth, who will gird himself for the battle?"
And (with no less pertinence): "When the trumpet faltereth, who
precisely is it who should cut the cackle?"
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